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2020 Clackamas Wildland Fires: Difference between revisions
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2020 Clackamas Wildland Fires (view source)
Revision as of 11:07, 25 December 2023
, 25 December 2023→Clackamas Town Center
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* Shelter operators assigned general shelter responsibilities to NET volunteers. | * Shelter operators assigned general shelter responsibilities to NET volunteers. | ||
Overall, the response at the evacuation site went well and proved a valuable experience for participating NETs. That NETs succeeded in a scenario PBEM never ''specifically'' trained them for demonstrated the high value of preparing NETs to problem solve creatively inside accepted response frameworks and roles.[[File:CTC.Evac Notice.jpg|alt=Card handed to evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center before the evacuation center closed.|thumb|''Card handed to evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center before the evacuation center closed.'']] | Overall, the response at the evacuation site went well and proved a valuable experience for participating NETs. That NETs succeeded in a scenario PBEM never ''specifically'' trained them for demonstrated the high value of preparing NETs to problem solve creatively inside accepted response frameworks and roles. | ||
== Observations and Recommendations == | |||
=== Observation #1: Concerning use of ICS === | |||
'''''After arriving on scene, the NET Coordinator did not initiate and institute sufficient Incident Command System (ICS) practices to maintain a well organized deployment, contributing to uneven situational awareness for NET volunteers.''''' | |||
NET volunteers most often deploy to responses with pre-established command and ICS protocols in place when they arrive. This deployment marked the first time NETs took charge of a large, comprehensive, and multifaceted response effort outside of simulations and exercises. | |||
This shift in responsibility, unfortunately, did not include a requisite shift in the NET Coordinator’s capacity to organize the deployment along ICS lines, occupied as that individual was gathering information and deploying volunteers. NET Team Leaders generally initiated ICS protocols themselves and kept serviceable records. But because ICS protocols were loose from the beginning, their implementation was spotty throughout the response. | |||
As a result, transference of information from shift to shift was uneven. Occasionally, NET volunteers lacked a clear objective for their shift. Responding NET volunteers at times felt confused on responsibilities filling specific assignments (particularly helping at the showers or administering access to the cellphone charging area). Good ICS record keeping would have clarified confusion at the end of the incident around who owned which pieces of equipment loaned to the command post. NETs received good information on services to connect to evacuees, but some gaps emerged due to poor ICS recordkeeping and laxity passing on documentation. | |||
ICS discipline would also have dispelled blurriness and produced records around specifically which evacuees volunteers engaged with and how often. Finally, NETs experienced gaps in consistent and reliable contact information for other partners involved in the response (e.g. vet response, Red Cross personnel, etc). | |||
'''Recommendations:''' | |||
* NET Coordinator should task specialized NET volunteers with establishing ICS protocols and documenting in the first hour of the response, including the documentation/writing of volunteer position descriptions. This will free up the NET Coordinator to manage deployments and liaise with the EOC. This may require additional training in ICS protocols and procedures. | |||
* For future deployments, prepare a binder/log book with ICS forms that the NET Coordinator takes to the first hour of the response and turns over to the NET Team Leader to use; and, is transferred to NET Team Leaders during shift changes. A binder like this can also serve as an iterative resource directory for all volunteers to use when connecting evacuees to help. NET Team Leaders already possess similar binders, but a binder of ICS forms assigned to an incident rather than an individual is needed. | |||
=== Observation #2: Concerning donations planning === | |||
'''''Responders possessed no initial plan to manage incoming donations from the community.''''' | |||
The community outpouring of support for evacuees included non-monetary donations…lots of them. Donated items ran the gamut from the very helpful (such as food or sanitation supplies) to items not helpful in the judgment of any emergency manager. Many donors came to Clackamas Town Center after encouragement and anecdotes in social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twittter, and NextDoor. | |||
Donations reflect a generous community spirit, but can place a significant burden on disaster response areas and personnel not equipped or prepared to process them. In fact, emergency managers often refer to the inevitable waves of donations as the “second disaster”, because it drains scarce response capacity and resources. Several evacuation sites around Clackamas County accepted donations for evacuees, but Clackamas Town Center was not intended as one of them. Nonetheless, donations piled up and occupied a portion of the evacuation area at Clackamas Town Center. | |||
Evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center site, for the most part, did not need donations. Many evacuees at the site arrived in RVs stocked with supplies needed for life safety and comfort to last for days or even weeks. Of course, not all evacuees arrived with that level of resources; Clackamas Town Center also hosted evacuees who had lost their homes and everything in them, or, the RVs they drove to the Town Center ''were'' their homes and they had little to begin with. But the in-kind donations received at Clackamas Town Center largely outsized the need, and responders had no plan to manage them. | |||
Absent a plan, donors piled up goods at two locations in the evacuation area. Evacuees, homeless persons, and others perused the “stockpile” (as it came to be called) and took what they needed. The stockpile attracted behavior not accurately described as “theft” as non-evacuees took supplies but certainly out of scope with what donors intended. For example, responders noticed several cars from outside the Town Center arrive empty, drivers filling the vehicle with donated supplies, driving away, and returning later to load up again, until CTC security or responders directed them not to return. | |||
The scene at the stockpile was disorganized, but not chaotic, and conflicts did not erupt. But, again, that likely reflects the higher level of preparedness of many evacuees at Clackamas Town Center. A situation with more evacuees, less prepared and with scarcer resources, could result in a security situation threatening the safety of evacuees and volunteers. | |||
To mitigate the disorganization, NET volunteers consolidated the two ad hoc donation areas into one. NET volunteers designated a throughway for vehicles near the new stockpile, blocked vehicular traffic on the other side of it, and Salvation Army volunteers staffed the area and helped evacuees find supplies they needed as “storekeepers” by retrieving items and keeping others out of the area (which also insightfully served as a COVID-19 prevention measure). NETs banned and redirected incoming donations after September 12, though the stockpile remained mostly undiminished up to the last day. Salvation Army took responsibility for remaining donations and removed them from the site on September 18. | |||
'''Recommendations:''' | |||
* Clackamas County Emergency Management should develop a county-wide plan for the donation of material goods from the community. The plan should include designated donation sites for Clackamas PIOs to post and share along with lists of needed items and encouragement to donors to give cash instead of goods. | |||
* PBEM should provide a curriculum of disaster donations management to NETs and other volunteers who wish to receive the training. | |||
* NETs and other responders should prepare a system to distinguish evacuees from everyone else and cut down on or eliminate non-evacuees from taking donations. For example, giving every confirmed evacuee a Tyvek wristband (or other identifier that can be concealed easier) that they show in order to enter a donations site (using a system like this could be extended to indicate eligibility for other evacuee services as well, such as the showers). This would also address recommendations made for Observation 5 below. | |||
* Wayfinding signs worked well in a site as spread out as Clackamas Town Center. Clackamas Emergency Management provided dry-erase A-frame signs that helped evacuees and others find showers, donation sites, and other services. Responders should consider A-frame signs a basic need in any evacuation site that covers as much ground as Clackamas Town Center did. | |||
=== Observation #3: Concerning Everbridge === | |||
'''''Everbridge continued to prove a highly effective means of deploying the NET volunteers.''''' | |||
For years, PBEM has used Everbridge to request and deploy NETs for smaller incidents. Its use deploying NETs to the Clackamas fires only underscored its utility. | |||
The NET Coordinator put out seven notifications to NET volunteers via Everbridge during the response period. Each notification included a request to NETs to fill 12 to 24 shifts on average. NETs filled nearly all shifts inside of four minutes after sending the request; NETs filled ''all'' the shifts after thirty minutes at the latest. | |||
The means of message delivery deserves note as well. Over the response period, NETs collectively acknowledged message receipt 5,271 times. Of that number, volunteers received and acknowledged a deployment request via SMS 61% of the time (with 33% by voice and 6% by email). | |||
NET volunteer Helen Chauncey noted one interesting way PBEM could improve the deployment system: set it up in such a way that NETs sharing a shift can contact each other ahead of the shift to briefly introduce themselves, plan, and get ready to collaborate. | |||
'''Recommendations:''' | |||
* PBEM should continue to use the Everbridge/Sign-up Genius method to deploy volunteers. | |||
* For the most expedient response, PBEM should put SMS (both work and home) at the top of the notification method when deploying NETs. | |||
* PBEM should consider a deployment method that allows NETs sharing a shift to coordinate ahead of time. | |||
=== Observation #4: Concerning drones === | |||
'''''Drone reconnaissance could have added value to response intelligence and planning.''''' | |||
[[File:CTC.Evac Notice.jpg|alt=Card handed to evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center before the evacuation center closed.|thumb|''Card handed to evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center before the evacuation center closed.'']] | |||
== References and Notes == | == References and Notes == | ||
