2020 Clackamas Wildland Fires

A series of large wildfires starting in mid-August 2020 and burning throughout Oregon coalesced into the state's largest deployment of wildfire response resources and one of the most destructive wildfire seasons in Oregon's history. Clackamas County was particularly impacted. "The two large fires that impacted Clackamas County were the Clackamas Fire Complex (11,210 acres) and the Riverside Incident (138,054 acres, 139 structures lost and 4 injuries)." On request from Clackamas County Emergency Management, NET volunteers operated an evacuation center from September 11 to September 18. This deployment was the first time NETs operated independently on a large incident, covering multiple response capabilities. This article is an After-Action Report for the deployment.

Scope

This after action report (AAR) focuses on the response of Portland’s Neighborhood Emergency Team (NET) volunteers to 2020’s wildfire siege of Clackamas County . Wildfires raged in Clackamas County from August to December, but (as Clackamas County is outside NET’s service district) NET volunteers responded to support Clackamas response efforts only as needed, from September 11 to September 19, 2020 .

This AAR mostly recounts NET deployment to the Clackamas Town Center evacuation site . However, NET volunteers also served briefly at other evacuation sites: the Oregon Convention Center and United Methodist in Oak Grove . This AAR makes observations and recommendations relevant to NET volunteers, NET Team Leaders, and NET Coordinators for future deployments and exercises.

Clackamas Fire District #1 completed a more comprehensive AAR of the Clackamas Fires, available at https://clackamasfire.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-01-21-AAR-Executive-Summary-Final.pdf.

Methodology

Assessments were requested by participants immediately after the deployment, but the AAR was not completed until June of 2021 (COVID response delayed completion) . This AAR includes the following inputs:

• Notes from an online debriefing meeting with NET responders on 09/16/2020 (recording posted HERE and embedded on this page);
• Emails shared from NET responders regarding the incident (many of which are attached as Appendix B);
• Feedback on the first draft of the AAR from NET responders, Clackamas County staff, and PBEM staff.

Background and Timeline

Assets and Capabilities

Clackamas Emergency Management

Clackamas County activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on September 8, in response to the complex wildfire conflagration. The Operations Section within the EOC-ICS Structure established a Shelter Branch, responsible for coordinating the immediate shelter needs of evacuees . During the Clackamas Town Center (CTC) operation, the Shelter Branch was staffed by two Branch Managers, and supported by the Operations Section Chief. Partner agencies supported the EOC by providing two additional staff to supplement and support sheltering. The EOC deployed Clackamas County CERT teams to the CTC evacuation site as well, with the mission to assist evacuees in receiving resources and information. The Milwaukie CERT Team provided approximately 200 hours of service to the CTC evacuation site, and were active at other sites as well.

Portland Neighborhood Emergency Teams (Portland NET)

Portland NET is the largest CERT program by membership in the Portland Metro Area, with 2,164 active volunteers and over 29,000 volunteer hours contributed in 2020 . Traditionally, Portland NET operates only inside City of Portland city limits; deploying outside of Portland into Clackamas County was an unusual event. The Portland Bureau of Emergency Management (PBEM) manages NET, with selected PBEM staff assigned to oversee NET deployments. PBEM and NET aim to serve the community with a trauma informed perspective and lead responses with equity and inclusion first.

The depth of Portland NET’s bench of volunteers is key to its operational capacity. Not only does having a large pool of volunteers to draw from mean that NET can fill hundreds of volunteer shifts in a deployment (including overnight shifts), but also provides the deployment with a diversity of relevant expertise. For example, volunteer knowledge of disaster psychology, public outreach, administration, and command center setup and management all played critical roles in this response.

Clackamas Town Center

Clackamas Town Center (CTC) is a shopping center at 12000 SE 82nd Avenue in unincorporated Clackamas County, managed and co-owned by Brookfield Properties Retail Group. CTC includes 1,230,000 square feet of retail space and a parking lot with 6,800 spaces. Most evacuees occupied approximately 23 .5 acres in the northeast parking lot. Inside that area, evacuees and operations were concentrated inside an area of 11.3 acres (see site map).

Brookfield Manager Dennis Curtis cooperated closely with the Clackamas County EOC to allow fire evacuees to camp at the CTC parking lot and connect evacuees to services.

At all hours, CTC security routinely patrolled the areas designated to evacuees and trespassed persons stealing supplies or presenting behavior that risked re-traumatizing evacuees. CTC Security Director Tim Harrold trains the security team in compassionate and trauma-informed approaches. This training proved important to the success of the deployment when security officers engaged with evacuees and with non- evacuees on site experiencing homelessness.

Salvation Army Cascade Division

Representatives of The Salvation Army’s Cascade Division did not report on their capabilities for this after-action report. However, they provided critical aid to evacuees at CTC. On September 21, their public Facebook page reported their Clackamas County response to the fires (at CTC and elsewhere) included:

• Served Meals: 21,898
• Snacks: 13,969
• Drinks: 16,229
• Home Delivered Meals: 9,185
• Food Boxes: 1,811
• Emotional & Spiritual Care: 1,932

Background: Clackamas County Fires

On September 7, 2020, extreme heat and wind events caused major power outages and evacuation orders for areas of Clackamas County. With 15 wildland fires burning, Clackamas County declared a state of emergency on September 8. By that point, response professionals had already evacuated approximately 1,500 Clackamas County residents under Level 3 evacuation orders (“Go!”).

Clackamas County opened many evacuation sites for residents fleeing the conflagrations. By September 9, the Clackamas County EOC recognized Clackamas Town Center (as well as the Gladstone Seventh Day Adventist camp and several other sites) as an evacuation site for families in recreational vehicles (RVs) and fifth wheelers. Persons without RVs were directed to other evacuation locations. Clackamas County stood down the evacuee site ten days later at 1230 hours on September 18.

NETs were placed on standby to assist with shelter operations on September 10, at 15:38, at the request of Multnomah County (working to aid Clackamas County). NETs arrived at Clackamas Town Center at 13:45 on September 11.

The original intent was for NET volunteers to be on site twenty-four hours. However, overnight professional security hired by the State of Oregon began taking shifts the night of September 14, obviating the need for a NET presence at the evacuation site from 10 PM to 6 AM the next morning. NETs completed their last shift at CTC at 19:30 on September 17, and their last shift in Clackamas (at the Oak Grove evacuation center) at 0400 on September 19.

Volunteers took a count of CTC evacuee campsites each day they deployed (the September 12 census was later lost). A typical camp included two to five people and pets. Campsite numbers at CTC were:

TABLE TABLE TABLE

Overview of the Portland NET Response

Clackamas Town Center

• 24 operational periods (including two overnight) between 13:45 on 09/11 and 19:30 on 09/18.
• Total of 143 shifts, filled by 113 NET volunteers.
• Average shift duration was four hours and 45 minutes (except overnight shifts, which were about twelve hours long).
• NET volunteers logged a total of 668 volunteer hours responding at Clackamas Town Center.
• When deployed via Everbridge, NETs filled almost all shifts inside 30 minutes, and on average NETs filled all available shifts four minutes after the Everbridge message reached them.

• Clackamas County Emergency Management directed NET volunteers to complete the following mission objectives:
  • Set up Incident Command Center on site at Clackamas Town Center (CTC);
  • Act as lead coordinator on site at CTC, and the touchstone for the evacuees there;
  • Act as main point of contact for people at CTC to get information and be referred to available resources;
  • Refer immediate concerns back to the Joint Information Center (JIC);
  • Call into the Donations and Volunteer briefings;
  • Coordinate donations (i.e. turning away donations still being dropped off, coordinating pick up of donations on site with local food pantries);
  • Monitor sanitary conditions;
  • Monitor safety and security concerns;
  • Attend Just-In-Time training as needed;
  • Direct and distribute resources on site.

Oak Grove shelter and the Oregon Convention Center shelter

The Oak Grove shelter was hosted by United Methodist, and the Red Cross was operated primarily by the Red Cross.

• 13 shifts (most of them night or overnight shifts).
• 87 volunteer hours
• Shelter operators assigned general shelter responsibilities to NET volunteers.

Overall, the response at the evacuation site went well and proved a valuable experience for participating NETs. That NETs succeeded in a scenario PBEM never specifically trained them for demonstrated the high value of preparing NETs to problem solve creatively inside accepted response frameworks and roles.

Observations and Recommendations

Observation #1: Concerning use of ICS

After arriving on scene, the NET Coordinator did not initiate and institute sufficient Incident Command System (ICS) practices to maintain a well organized deployment, contributing to uneven situational awareness for NET volunteers.

NET volunteers most often deploy to responses with pre-established command and ICS protocols in place when they arrive. This deployment marked the first time NETs took charge of a large, comprehensive, and multifaceted response effort outside of simulations and exercises.

This shift in responsibility, unfortunately, did not include a requisite shift in the NET Coordinator’s capacity to organize the deployment along ICS lines, occupied as that individual was gathering information and deploying volunteers. NET Team Leaders generally initiated ICS protocols themselves and kept serviceable records. But because ICS protocols were loose from the beginning, their implementation was spotty throughout the response.

As a result, transference of information from shift to shift was uneven. Occasionally, NET volunteers lacked a clear objective for their shift. Responding NET volunteers at times felt confused on responsibilities filling specific assignments (particularly helping at the showers or administering access to the cellphone charging area). Good ICS record keeping would have clarified confusion at the end of the incident around who owned which pieces of equipment loaned to the command post. NETs received good information on services to connect to evacuees, but some gaps emerged due to poor ICS recordkeeping and laxity passing on documentation.

ICS discipline would also have dispelled blurriness and produced records around specifically which evacuees volunteers engaged with and how often. Finally, NETs experienced gaps in consistent and reliable contact information for other partners involved in the response (e.g. vet response, Red Cross personnel, etc).

Recommendations:

• NET Coordinator should task specialized NET volunteers with establishing ICS protocols and documenting in the first hour of the response, including the documentation/writing of volunteer position descriptions. This will free up the NET Coordinator to manage deployments and liaise with the EOC. This may require additional training in ICS protocols and procedures.
• For future deployments, prepare a binder/log book with ICS forms that the NET Coordinator takes to the first hour of the response and turns over to the NET Team Leader to use; and, is transferred to NET Team Leaders during shift changes. A binder like this can also serve as an iterative resource directory for all volunteers to use when connecting evacuees to help. NET Team Leaders already possess similar binders, but a binder of ICS forms assigned to an incident rather than an individual is needed.

Observation #2: Concerning donations planning

Responders possessed no initial plan to manage incoming donations from the community.

The community outpouring of support for evacuees included non-monetary donations…lots of them. Donated items ran the gamut from the very helpful (such as food or sanitation supplies) to items not helpful in the judgment of any emergency manager. Many donors came to Clackamas Town Center after encouragement and anecdotes in social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twittter, and NextDoor.

Donations reflect a generous community spirit, but can place a significant burden on disaster response areas and personnel not equipped or prepared to process them. In fact, emergency managers often refer to the inevitable waves of donations as the “second disaster”, because it drains scarce response capacity and resources. Several evacuation sites around Clackamas County accepted donations for evacuees, but Clackamas Town Center was not intended as one of them. Nonetheless, donations piled up and occupied a portion of the evacuation area at Clackamas Town Center.

Evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center site, for the most part, did not need donations. Many evacuees at the site arrived in RVs stocked with supplies needed for life safety and comfort to last for days or even weeks. Of course, not all evacuees arrived with that level of resources; Clackamas Town Center also hosted evacuees who had lost their homes and everything in them, or, the RVs they drove to the Town Center were their homes and they had little to begin with. But the in-kind donations received at Clackamas Town Center largely outsized the need, and responders had no plan to manage them.

Absent a plan, donors piled up goods at two locations in the evacuation area. Evacuees, homeless persons, and others perused the “stockpile” (as it came to be called) and took what they needed. The stockpile attracted behavior not accurately described as “theft” as non-evacuees took supplies but certainly out of scope with what donors intended. For example, responders noticed several cars from outside the Town Center arrive empty, drivers filling the vehicle with donated supplies, driving away, and returning later to load up again, until CTC security or responders directed them not to return.

The scene at the stockpile was disorganized, but not chaotic, and conflicts did not erupt. But, again, that likely reflects the higher level of preparedness of many evacuees at Clackamas Town Center. A situation with more evacuees, less prepared and with scarcer resources, could result in a security situation threatening the safety of evacuees and volunteers.

To mitigate the disorganization, NET volunteers consolidated the two ad hoc donation areas into one. NET volunteers designated a throughway for vehicles near the new stockpile, blocked vehicular traffic on the other side of it, and Salvation Army volunteers staffed the area and helped evacuees find supplies they needed as “storekeepers” by retrieving items and keeping others out of the area (which also insightfully served as a COVID-19 prevention measure). NETs banned and redirected incoming donations after September 12, though the stockpile remained mostly undiminished up to the last day. Salvation Army took responsibility for remaining donations and removed them from the site on September 18.

Recommendations:

• Clackamas County Emergency Management should develop a county-wide plan for the donation of material goods from the community. The plan should include designated donation sites for Clackamas PIOs to post and share along with lists of needed items and encouragement to donors to give cash instead of goods.
• PBEM should provide a curriculum of disaster donations management to NETs and other volunteers who wish to receive the training.
• NETs and other responders should prepare a system to distinguish evacuees from everyone else and cut down on or eliminate non-evacuees from taking donations. For example, giving every confirmed evacuee a Tyvek wristband (or other identifier that can be concealed easier) that they show in order to enter a donations site (using a system like this could be extended to indicate eligibility for other evacuee services as well, such as the showers). This would also address recommendations made for Observation 5 below.
• Wayfinding signs worked well in a site as spread out as Clackamas Town Center. Clackamas Emergency Management provided dry-erase A-frame signs that helped evacuees and others find showers, donation sites, and other services. Responders should consider A-frame signs a basic need in any evacuation site that covers as much ground as Clackamas Town Center did.

Observation #3: Concerning Everbridge

Everbridge continued to prove a highly effective means of deploying the NET volunteers.

For years, PBEM has used Everbridge to request and deploy NETs for smaller incidents. Its use deploying NETs to the Clackamas fires only underscored its utility.

The NET Coordinator put out seven notifications to NET volunteers via Everbridge during the response period. Each notification included a request to NETs to fill 12 to 24 shifts on average. NETs filled nearly all shifts inside of four minutes after sending the request; NETs filled all the shifts after thirty minutes at the latest.

The means of message delivery deserves note as well. Over the response period, NETs collectively acknowledged message receipt 5,271 times. Of that number, volunteers received and acknowledged a deployment request via SMS 61% of the time (with 33% by voice and 6% by email).

NET volunteer Helen Chauncey noted one interesting way PBEM could improve the deployment system: set it up in such a way that NETs sharing a shift can contact each other ahead of the shift to briefly introduce themselves, plan, and get ready to collaborate.

Recommendations:

• PBEM should continue to use the Everbridge/Sign-up Genius method to deploy volunteers.
• For the most expedient response, PBEM should put SMS (both work and home) at the top of the notification method when deploying NETs.
• PBEM should consider a deployment method that allows NETs sharing a shift to coordinate ahead of time.

Observation #4: Concerning drones

Drone reconnaissance could have added value to response intelligence and planning.

Card handed to evacuees at the Clackamas Town Center before the evacuation center closed.