1996 High Water Flood: Difference between revisions
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=== Operations === | === Operations === | ||
The mission of the Operations Section is to respond to the emergency and take whatever action necessary. This involves the development and implementation of all tactical operations necessary to achieve the Incident Commander's strategic goals, and management and coordination of all resources assigned to the flood fight. | The mission of the Operations Section is to respond to the emergency and take whatever action necessary. This involves the development and implementation of all tactical operations necessary to achieve the Incident Commander's strategic goals, and management and coordination of all resources assigned to the flood fight. Representatives of City Bureaus of Water, Fire, Buildings, Maintenance, Police and Parks were in the Operations Section. | ||
Representatives of City Bureaus of Water, Fire, Buildings, Maintenance, Police and Parks were in the Operations Section. | |||
==== Lessons ==== | ==== Lessons ==== | ||
Operations needed to have a field or area commander with staff (minimum one PIO, Logistics representative, and Planning Representative) at each major incident location, i.e. The "Harbor Wall", Willamette River, Johnson Creek, Holgate Lake, NE Marine | Operations needed to have a field or area commander with staff (minimum one PIO, Logistics representative, and Planning Representative) at each major incident location, i.e. The "Harbor Wall", Willamette River, Johnson Creek, Holgate Lake, NE Marine Drive Levee, Hayden Island, and some complexes of slides etc. Individual bureau Emergency Operation Centers needed to use ICS so they could better understand and communicate with the Portland EOC. Bureau Incident Action Plans needed to be shared with the City EOG to enhance coordination. | ||
In summation of the respondents input, communications inside the EOC and both into and from the community needs improvement. The level of technology of the equipment, capability of responders to use the equipment, and the placement of the communications equipment was out of synch and needs more attention. Information was non-uniformly relayed at shift change and could have been more efficiently transmitted through the use of visuals and written plans. It was said repeatedly that clerical support for each section were necessary for logging and reporting of information. | |||
