1996 High Water Flood: Difference between revisions

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On February 18<sup>th</sup> 1996, Oregonian reporter Brian T. Meehan summarized the disaster this way:


== City of Portland Official High Water Flood After Action Report (AAR) ==
''"In Downtown Portland, the Willamette crested at 28.6 feet, the top of the harbor wall. Downstream, the Columbia hissed at double the normal current - half again bigger than the Mississippi.'' ''Thousands lined the waterfront for a peek at the Willamette, awash in logs and heartache. The river's power was humbling. A line from T.S. Eliot echoed:'' 'I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable.' ''Floodwaters tore through Tualatin, Oregon City and Lake Oswego. Rising waters and tumbling hillsides isolated Tillamook and devastated the Columbia County towns of Vernonia, Clatskanie and Mist.'' ''Mud and ruin spilled, but a curious value surfaced. The flood bound people in ways urban life rarely does. Volunteers erected a plywood barrier along Portland's harbor wall. Strangers hauled furniture for people they'll never meet again. Convicts loaded sandbags.'' ''Young people led the way. Students from Milwaukie and Rex Putnam high schools reached out to Oak Grove. West Linn students sandbagged a flooded restaurant in arch rival Oregon City. Oregon City, Lake Oswego and Tigard students traded schoolbooks for shovels.'' ''Across Oregon, selfless acts knit a new definition of community. Under the worst conditions, many Oregonians put strangers first in the miracle that is the human spirit."''
{{#ev:youtube|jspW0z_bD80|350|right|'''''Video: Newscast of the 1996 flood'''''|frame}}


=== Executive Summary ===
'''The February Flood of 1996 response is of interest to both NET volunteers and to the history of emergency management in Portland.''' For NET volunteers, the 1996 Flood brought the first documented NET deployment event. For Portland, it was the first major disaster response in the "modern era" of emergency management.<ref>"Modern era of emergency management" would include any major disaster since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prior to that year, disaster response at the federal level was fragmented across agencies. Portland had, of course, experienced disasters [[Historic Disasters in the Portland Metro Area|prior to the 1996 flood]]. But it appears the flood was the incident that involved local bureaus collaborating using the Incident Command System (ICS).</ref>
The Basic Emergency Plan was approved by the Mayor and City Council on May 1<sup>st</sup> of 1996. The quotes following are from the '96 plan which has been updated as of January 1997.


'''"The-purpose of the City of Portland Plan is to assist Portland City government in minimizing the adverse effects to life and property from natural and man-caused disasters."'''
== NET Roles in the 1996 Flood ==
[[File:1996.02.09.Helping Hands.jpg|alt=Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.|thumb|350x350px|''Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.'']]
'''The 1996 Flood is one of the first documented deployment of NET volunteers.'''<ref>The '''''first''''' known NET deployment was on December 12 of the prior year for a windstorm, but that was obviously on a smaller scale.</ref> The Portland AAR mentions two volunteers (presumably NETs) assisting five other personnel in the EOC. Alongside spontaneous volunteers, NETs also undoubtedly helped to sandbag and erect barrier fences. However, no record recovered by PBEM says exactly how many NETs deployed. It is also unclear what dates NETs and other volunteers were deployed, but the acute deployment period ran from February 5<sup>th</sup> to February 9<sup>th</sup>.


Bureaus listed in the 1996 Plan are Fire, Parks, Buildings, General Services, Purchasing, Transportation Engineering, Traffic Management, Maintenance, Emergency Communications, Water, Environmental Services, City Attorney, Police, Office of Finance & Administration, Records and Archives, and the Office of Neighborhood Associations.
Most notably, PF&R deployed NET volunteers to distribute information to business owners in the central eastside. ''The Oregonian'' mentioned NETs engaging in this activity [https://portlandnet.tumblr.com/post/187782471860/nets-during-the-1996-flood-net-volunteer-nicholas in an article] posted to the right on this page.  


==== #1 Basic Plan Issue ====
== 1996 Portland Floods: Background ==
'''"The situations addressed by this Plan are those in which the actions of many different bureaus must be coordinated."'''
The Flood of 1996 in Oregon was a severe weather event that took place in February of that year. It was characterized by heavy rainfall, high winds, and flooding, affecting several regions in the Pacific Northwest, including Portland. The Willamette River crested at 28.55 feet, where the typical level in February is seven feet.
According to Joseph Rose with ''The Oregonian'', a convergence of weather events contributed to the flood's cause:


'''Identified Need'''
* Abnormally high rainfall (7.12 inches, 125% above normal) that saturated the soil and had rivers running high in January.
* Heavy snowfall in the mountains in late January.
* A weeklong deep freeze in the valley. A headline in the Feb. 2, 1996, Oregonian read: "Cold weather makes plumbers hot item."
* On Feb. 6, 1996, a warm Pineapple Express jetstream melted the snow while bringing a heavy deluge of rain. That was [https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2019WR024950 the trigger].
* Within hours, every body of water in the region and many on the Oregon Coast suddenly went to flood stage and beyond.<ref>Oregonian/OregonLive, J. R. |. (2020, February 5). Remembering Oregon’s epic 1996 flood (photos). ''Oregonlive''. https://www.oregonlive.com/history/2016/02/oregon_flood_of_1996_20_years.html</ref>


Continue to identify Bureaus needing to be more involved or involved at different levels. Reassignment of employees, volunteer management and section job descriptions have been identified as areas needing attention.
Tragically, the Flood of '96 resulted in eight fatalities, with at least four people losing their lives in one day alone. The flood led to over one hundred landslides in Portland alone and caused millions of dollars in highway damage. Total damages across the region exceeded $1 billion.<ref>NOAA’s National Weather Service. (n.d.). ''Flooding in Oregon''. https://www.weather.gov/safety/flood-states-or</ref>


'''Planned Action'''
== The 1996 After Action Report ==
 
{| class="wikitable" style="width: 40%;"
As of January, 1997 the Basic Plan revision includes reference to job descriptions, including time commitments, and bureau tasks. This will facilitate greater City-wide coordination for the emergency management process. A plan for recruitment and training will be developed for incoming and retained EOC responders.
|+
 
| style="background: lightcyan" |'''To download a copy of the 1996 After Action Report, [https://hcpaw.portlandoregon.gov/u/9BchGB2XIXnmFyEb/0bfc21fc-5c40-4e4d-a14a-e8a7a51159f4?l CLICK HERE].'''
==== #2 Basic Plan Issue ====
|}
'''"It is important to realize that no one bureau is going to rescue a City during a disaster situation. Further, it is true that City government agencies will not possess all resources and talent necessary to protect the citizens of the City."'''
[[File:1996 Flood Graph.jpg|alt=River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.|thumb|''River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.''|350x350px]]
 
[[File:Katz 96 Flood.jpg|alt=Mayor Katz watching the 96 flood.|thumb|350x350px|''Portland Mayor Vera Katz stands along "[https://www.wweek.com/portland/article-23431-feb-8-1996-vera-katz-builds-her-wall.html Vera's Wall]", where volunteers filled and dropped approximately 40,000 sandbags to keep waters from topping over Waterfront Park.'']]
'''Identified Need'''
The aftermath of the 1996 flood led to discussions and efforts to improve flood management and infrastructure resilience in the affected areas. It remains an important event in Oregon's history, highlighting the impact of severe weather on communities and the need for preparedness and response measures.
 
For those who participate as EOC responders, a greater understanding of Bureau resources, responsibilities and capabilities has developed as a result of the relationships built during training, exercises, and actual occurrences. This coordination and familiarization is a subsequent benefit from the process of preparing to respond as a City unified force. The need here is to continue to refine each bureaus and employees' capabilities and responsibilities during a disaster.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The understanding of each Bureau's responsibility as a primary or secondary responder, their identification of personnel and definition of their duties during emergency activation needs to be decided upon and made a part of their Basic Plans. As developed, these Bureau specific decisions, will be incorporated into the plan.
 
==== #3 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"For this reason, the City has endorsed a three tier EMC concept. This concept blends the legal mandates of the government structure with the private resources of the community. By working together and maintaining open lines of communication, we will be able to field and coordinate a tremendous amount of  resources and talent."'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
The responsibility of the EMC as outlined in the Basic Plan on page 9 is to "plan exercise schedule, budget recommendations, public education, update bureau and office plans, coordinate training, make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council (DRC), meet as necessary and involve bureaus and office directors." The Mayor and Council has approved the plan with these responsibilities listed and yet it is uncertain whether all EMC members recognize their part in City Emergencies. These responsibilities need to be clarified and reaffirmed by the EMC.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
As of January, 1997 the job description of the EMC will be changed to" <u>Approve</u> exercise schedule; <u>coordinate</u> public education; make budget recommendations; <u>coordinate</u> Bureau and Office plans with the Basic Plan; <u>approve</u> training coordination; Make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council" in the Basic Plan.
 
==== #4 Basic Plan Issue ====
"The Chief of the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Emergency Manager and the Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM) are charged with the responsibility to develop and implement an all hazards emergency management plan in the City of Portland."
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
POEM needs to continue giving assistance in Basic Plan compliance through training, exercises, and technical expertise. POEM will continue to integrate the results of exercises and actual events into the development of the all hazards plan.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The EMC, through its growth and development, will further identify and define the responsibilities of the bureaus and continue to facilitate a cooperative working environment. Future exercises will incorporate appropriate sections of the Basic Plan.
 
==== #5 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"This Plan attempts to define in a straight forward manner who does what, when, where, and how in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters."'''
 
Under the authority of Title 15(15.12.020) requires annual review, training and evaluation of City Bureaus and offices assigned emergency responsibilities.
 
"City Bureaus and offices assigned emergency responsibilities have the following tasks:
 
* Establish line of succession and provide personnel to the EOC as required.
* Assure that employees are aware of emergency situation and protective actions to be taken. ·
* Accomplish any special training which may be required.
* Protect vital records.
* Accomplish primary or support functions as indicated in the primary or support functions matrix.
* Develop and maintain/update operation procedures to accomplish primary and support functions.
* Provide available information on operations status to POEM to support reporting requirements.
* Participate in and assign personnel to the EMC who have the authority to speak for and commit their bureaus' resources."
 
'''"Government entities complying with this Plan shall not be liable for injury, death, or loss of property except in cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence."'''
 
'''"The Assumptions outlined in the Plan are that essential City services will be maintained as long as conditions permit."'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
The plan needs to better define Bureau involvement.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The EMC will review and approve the update of Plan (as prepared by POEM Staff) to define and determine bureau and employee involvement. This updated plan should be submitted to the DPC for approval.
 
==== #6 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"A disaster occurrence will require prompt and effective emergency response and recovery operations by the City government.<nowiki>''</nowiki>'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
Need better continuity between response and recovery phases.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
Training, identified in review of the flood. will be developed to provide responders with a greater understanding of the relationship between the phases and transitional process.
 
==== #7 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"Secondary city emergency operations will be based on the principle of self-help."'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
Need greater understanding of complimentary aspects of Neighborhood Emergency Teams to the functions of Emergency Responders; More employee training on emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery in the workplace and at home; Task specific training for sections such as crisis communication; More public education on disaster planning for organizations, businesses and industry.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
NET training continues to instruct citizens in 72 hour self sufficiency in the time of an emergency. Greater employee training is in the planning stage. Business and industry training is available through the Fire Bureau, Red Cross and other agencies. Inside Line will release regionally coordinated messages in January. The Flood Mitigation Workgroup recommended the development of an outreach and public information program to inform people of flood and landslide risks, mitigation measures and flood insurance.
 
==== #8 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"City government will bear the responsibility for utilizing all available local resources."'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
Identification of local resources is a part of the planning and exercise process. POEM needs to develop city legislation necessary to avoid gouging by vendors and contractors during emergencies. This legislation should not only protect city agencies but the general public. The Logistics Section needs to continue to compile a list of contracted vendors.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The EMC will be asked to review the proposed legislation. The Logistics section Chiefs will be encouraged to compile a list.
 
==== #9 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"Day to Day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency task by the bureaus or agencies concerned."'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
Disaster responders need to be excused from their normal responsibilities until they are no longer needed at the EOC or in the field/task. They also need to be available on an as needed basis during the recovery phase. Bureaus need to identify non-critical City functions that can be suspended during a disaster and those who can be reassigned to accomplish critical functions.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The Bureau plans will reflect the aforementioned concept of critical/non-critical operations of their work and workforce.
 
==== #10 Basic Plan Issue ====
'''"Portland will structure its response to and management of a disaster by using the Incident Command System ... "'''
 
'''Identified Need'''
 
Bureau Managers and key personnel need to develop and exercise disaster plans in accordance with the Incident Command System. Identify Bureau emergency operations personnel, develop Bureau specific emergency plans and provide training and exercises for their personnel.
 
'''Planned Action'''
 
The EMC will be asked to address this issue at their own bureau level.
[[File:1996 Flood Graph.jpg|alt=River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document.|thumb|River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.]]
 
=== Emergency Operations Center ===
This part of the After Action Report summarizes the activities that occurred during the Flood of 96 coined "Highwater II" from the perspective of the responders to the Portland Emergency Operations Center (EOC), 9911 SE Bush (Powell and 99th) Portland, Oregon from February 6th 1996 to February 15<sup>th</sup> 1996.
 
The Center functions as a meeting place where decision-makers of City Bureaus and liaison organizations, trained in the incident command system (ICS), can discuss and decide the priorities of the disaster and how to best use the resources available.
 
=== Authority ===
Chapter 15.04 of the City Code outlines the authority of the Portland Office of Emergency Management under the direction of the Mayor and supervised by the Fire Chief. The code outlines the authority of the Portland Office of Emergency Management during a declared disaster and in preparation for a disaster.
 
=== Introduction ===
''"In Downtown Portland, the Willamette crested at 28.6 feet, the top of the harbor wall. Downstream, the Columbia hissed at double the normal current - half again bigger than the Mississippi.''
 
''Thousands lined the waterfront for a peek at the Willamette, awash in logs and heartache. The river's power was humbling. A line from T.S. Eliot echoed: 'I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable.'''
 
''Floodwaters tore through Tualatin, Oregon City and Lake Oswego. Rising waters and tumbling hillsides isolated Tillamook and devastated the Columbia County towns of Vernonia, Clatskanie and Mist.''
 
''Mud and ruin spilled, but a curious value surfaced. The flood bound people in ways urban life rarely does. Volunteers erected a plywood barrier along Portland's harbor wall. Strangers hauled furniture for people they'll never meet again. Convicts loaded sandbags.''
 
''Young people led the way. Students from Milwaukie and Rex Putnam high schools reached out to Oak Grove. West Linn students sandbagged a flooded restaurant in arch rival Oregon City. Oregon City, Lake Oswego and Tigard students traded schoolbooks for shovels.''
 
''Across Oregon, selfless acts knit a new definition of community. Under the worst conditions, many Oregonians put strangers first in the miracle that is the human spirit."''
 
February 18th Sunday Oregonian Special Section, Brian T. Meehan
 
=== Disaster Policy Council ===
The Disaster Policy Council is responsible for making recommendations on City Policy to the Mayor. They are also to be the media contact, the liaison with federal, state and local officials, provide necessary resources and make policy decisions. They prioritize resource allocation for the City's coordinated effort to respond, mitigate, prepare and recover from disasters. The Disaster Policy Council is also responsible for deciding what actions can be taken to ensure that the City's response is at its maximum capacity.
 
The major concerns that surfaced during the event revolved around needed policies, training, and resources. The Disaster Policy Council needs to assure continuity of essential government services and allocate sufficient resources to their operations during a disaster. All City personnel need to be trained in their emergency response duties, including Managers and Supervisors, everyone must know what is expected of them, where they are to go and what they are to do in a professional and organized manner.
 
=== Incident Commander ===
The responsibilities of the Incident Commander (IC) include the overall management of the command and general staff at the EOC who are managing the City's response to the flood. Other duties include the development of strategic goals and incident objectives, and ordering and releasing resources.
The Incident Commander needed to conduct more frequent briefings for the entire group of responders.
 
=== Operations ===
The mission of the Operations Section is to respond to the emergency and take whatever action necessary. This involves the development and implementation of all tactical operations necessary to achieve the Incident Commander's strategic goals, and management and coordination of all resources assigned to the flood fight. Representatives of City Bureaus of Water, Fire, Buildings, Maintenance, Police and Parks were in the Operations Section.
==== Lessons ====
Operations needed to have a field or area commander with staff (minimum one PIO, Logistics representative, and Planning Representative) at each major incident location, i.e. The "Harbor Wall", Willamette River, Johnson Creek, Holgate Lake, NE Marine Drive Levee, Hayden Island, and some complexes of slides etc. Individual bureau Emergency Operation Centers needed to use ICS so they could better understand and communicate with the Portland EOC. Bureau Incident Action Plans needed to be shared with the City EOG to enhance coordination.
 
In summation of the respondents input, communications inside the EOC and both into and from the community needs improvement. The level of technology of the equipment, capability of responders to use the equipment, and the placement of the communications equipment was out of synch and needs more attention. Information was non-uniformly relayed at shift change and could have been more efficiently transmitted through the use of visuals and written plans. It was said repeatedly that clerical support for each section were necessary for logging and reporting of information.
 
=== Planning ===
Planning is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of information about the incident. Planning must include an assessment of the present and projected situation. Planning created the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for each operating shift or period and were responsible for conducting the planning meetings. They were responsible for plotting incidents on maps, maintaining the situation status boards, collecting and displaying a myriad of information, maintaining the status of resources in the field, collecting, cataloguing and filing all documentation related to the flood, and developing a variety of plans needed by Operations.
 
Representatives from Bureaus of Environmental Services, Police, Fire, Buildings, Water, Maintenance, Traffic Management, and the Auditors Office participated in the Planning Section duties.
 
==== Communication====
Issues surrounding better communications inside the EOG and with the region were mentioned as needing attention. Key areas of concern were briefing sessions which were limited and needing better locations, and agency coordination that needed City participation. More telephones and E-mail capability would expedite communications. Resource availability, such as templates for the Incident Action Plans, telephone rosters, agency directories, maps, critical utility locations, road information, radio templates hospital and EMC information, should be better understood by EOC responders. All of this would add to the ability of the Planning section to communicate more proficiently with the rest of the EOC response team.
 
==== Procedures ====
There was confusion between sections regarding roles and functions which needs to be remedied (this will probably improve with more training and exercise). The Incident Action Plan compilation, a duty of the Planning Section, would have been more expediently and efficiently ready for review if it had been on the computer system. Section staffing needs examination during the event to determine the number and qualities (proper focus and expertise) of the people on site during different phases of the event. Shift rotation also needs to be examined to adhere to safety guidelines and efficient use of personnel.
 
==== Training ====
The respondents stated the training needed to be tailored to the activities of the EOC specifically.
 
Planning needs development work both at the EOC and in the Field.
 
==== EOC Space ====
Much is said about the lack of space at the EOC. Specifically planning commented on the traffic pattern to the PIO Section and Copy Room through the Planning Section area, lack of a place to meet for briefings, lack of space for the liaisons that was easily accessible to the sections. Also mentioned was the need for security access control into the EOC.
 
=== Logistics ===
Logistics is responsible for providing facilities, services, equipment and materials for the incident which are not "everyday" necessities. Logistics is responsible for tracking all supplies and rental equipment, establishing a communications plan for the disaster; providing transportation for all phases and response locations of the disaster; plan for, acquire, and distribute food to disaster responders; maintain radio communication system; establish, expand and maintain a telephone system in the EOC; and maintain the EOC computer LAN system . They work closely with Finance to procure and rent equipment and supplies.
 
==== Staffing ====
The most evident need of the Logistics Section was increased staffing. The main void was the Volunteer Coordinator. Evaluators also identified that a person from the Bureau of Environmental Services was needed. "Store Keeper" expertise was needed in the Supply Unit. This was thought to lend a greater level of understanding of the City’s purchasing procedures and requirements. It would also be important to have managers from Fleet Management to run the Ground Support Unit.
 
==== Communication ====
More lists of contacts and possible participants, available on the computer, would expedite the delivery of service from the Logistics Section. On-site field inspectors for checking in and out equipment and personnel would allow for greater communication between the field and the EOC and lessen the room for error when ordering meals, accounting for equipment and staffing areas. Telephone conferences at the change of ·shifts between counterparts would give greater continuity and understanding of the activities needed and the reasons for actions taken.
 
The 800mhz radio system worked flawlessly, but a comprehensive communications plan was needed and more training on the use of the radios was indicated.
 
The non-emergency phone line needed up to date information and lists of pertinent phone numbers. Each 10 to 15 call takers needed to have an "emergency responder type" person as a supervisor or guide to answers. Notification of activities that cease to occur should be related to all sections.
 
==== Procedures ====
ICS provides a plan, a set of procedures and forms need to be developed for use by everyone within the section when requesting services or equipment. The Supply unit needed to establish criteria for incoming and outgoing requests for supplies at the beginning of the incident. This would have given them a better understanding of what was being ordered, by whom, for what, at what price and allow them the ability to find the best price and vendor for the service or supply. Purchase orders needed to be more detailed and formally submitted. A tracking and accountability system for rental equipment and issued supplies needs to be established before the event. This tracking system should be established so that shifts can create continuity of action without misunderstandings. Pre-existing lists of supplies that are normally ordered were needed to simplify the ordering process.
 
The most prevalent suggestion of the food evaluation was the need for greater coordination of the food delivery system. This includes knowing exactly where and how many meals are needed at designated locations; sanitation systems need to be coordinated with the public health department and supplies needed to be onsite or included in the delivery of food; a well balanced daily series of meals was needed.
 
==== Equipment ====
For more efficient operations of the logistics functions, a printer, fax machine, tape backup, IBIS and Softrisk Map program software and more computers are needed. Better mapping capabilities for the logistics section would allow staging area information to be projected on the wall. A uniform mapping software is needs to be standard for all sections.
 
==== Training ====
Training on City and FEMA purchasing processes and guidelines as well as EOC equipment use is important to the logistics section staff. Incident Command System training and the use of field representatives were also identified as necessary for the Logistics Section.
 
=== Finance ===
Finance is responsible for tracking all incident costs and evaluating the financial considerations of the incident. They estimate preliminary damage assessment needed for the disaster declaration; purchase all equipment and supplies acquired by logistics, keep track of personnel time and perform risk management functions.
 
The main issue surfacing during the event was the difference between the two shifts activities. From this, the Staff learned about their need to be better trained in the Finance Section so to guide the incident organization. Also it was learned that there is a need of for additional training of the Finance Section in the activities of preparing for and transitioning to the recovery phase while the event is in process. The Finance Section should have moved aggressively, evaluating the purchase, rental and contract agreements that were being made. The time at the EOC during the event should have been used to create a more efficient service delivery and tracking system of the Finance Section during the night shift so that the day shift could expeditiously respond to the needs at hand. A report from the Finance Section was only in the Incident Action Plans once.
 
=== Liaison ===
The Liaison Officer and Staff serves as a conduit between the City and the outside agencies which have expertise and resources to serve the specific incident. They workout interagency agreements and extend the City resources under the declaration of a disaster.
 
The main need identified was for the appointment of a Liaison Officer and Staff that would make sure needs were met and information shared for all parties involved.
 
=== Safety ===
The job of the Safety Officer and Staff is to alert the Incident Commander, Managers and public about the safety concerns of the event. Safety personnel exercise emergency authority to stop and prevent unsafe acts. Field Safety personnel monitor the operations in the field to protect city personnel. They also investigate accidents to determine the cause.
 
The main concerns of the Safety Section were the need for greater sanitation supplies and drinking water in the field and emergency field kits, radio kits and office supplies for the Safety Section staff. Procedural training is on the top of the list for Safety including participation in staging area check-in, EOC response, team rotation and personnel, and crowd control. The staffing of the Safety Section needs to include more City wide participation of safety personnel.
 
=== Public Information ===
The responsibility of the Public Information Officers (PIO) was to coordinate all information for the public and the media. The main job is to provide one voice for the citizens from the authorities within the City. They are to facilitate the access of the. media to the incident without impeding the activity of the responders. The Public Information function has the challenge of working with the field, the other bureaus and the EOC so that information dispersed to the public is timely, accurate and the top priority for citizen knowledge.
 
The Public Information Staff was challenged by many first time Emergency Operations Center activities such as the President landing on the river front, and the prioritization of information flow to the public. The PIO coordinated the visit of the FEMA Director, the Federal Highway Administration Secretary, and Army Corps of Engineers Commander. The needs identified were more staffing so that field PIO personnel could be available; greater understanding of the Incident Command System by the City Bureaus so that Bureau PIO's would work effectively with the City PIO's; EOC needs improvements such as computers with designated fax capabilities and Internet connection, TV proximity to PIO section and identified clerical support.
 
=== Staff ===
The EOC Staff's major responsibility is to facilitate the efficient operation of the Emergency Operations Center. From the Office of Emergency Management, the staff is responsible for development and maintenance of the EOC and for conducting training and exercises to develop the knowledge and ability of all responders.
 
Identified as the most important areas of needed improvement are communications, training, facility improvements and additional personnel. The EOC Staff learned that they need to be trained better in the details of each sections operation, so that they can coach participants in job responsibilities. They need to train responders more thoroughly in the operation of ttie equipment. They need to prompt frequent incident briefings and correct report preparation. They need to make sure that there is the proper format for communications at the change of shifts.


=== Flood Response Activity Log ===
The Portland AAR from the flood is itself a telling piece of work in the respect that the AAR recommendations/improvement plan is nearly identical to recommendations often seen in City of Portland AARs in decades since. The table below summarizes the report findings. Boxes highlighted in yellow indicate a plan item that ultimately contributed to the development of Portland NET.
{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable" style="width: 60%;"
|+
|+
!
!'''#'''
!
!Basic Plan Issue
!
!Identified Need
!
!Planned Action
|-
|#1
|''"The situations addressed by this Plan are those in which the actions of many different bureaus must be coordinated."''
|style="background: yellow"|Continue to identify Bureaus needing to be more involved or involved at different levels. Reassignment of employees, volunteer management and section job descriptions have been identified as areas needing attention.
|As of January1997 the Basic Plan revision includes reference to job descriptions, including time commitments, and bureau tasks. This will facilitate greater City-wide coordination for the emergency management process. A plan for recruitment and training will be developed for incoming and retained EOC responders.
|-
|#2
|''"It is important to realize that no one bureau is going to rescue a City during a disaster situation. Further, it is true that City government agencies will not possess all resources and talent necessary to protect the citizens of the City."''
|For those who participate as EOC responders, a greater understanding of Bureau resources, responsibilities and capabilities has developed as a result of the relationships built during training, exercises, and actual occurrences. This coordination and familiarization is a subsequent benefit from the process of preparing to respond as a City unified force. The need here is to continue to refine each bureaus and employees' capabilities and responsibilities during a disaster.
|The understanding of each Bureau's responsibility as a primary or secondary responder, their identification of personnel and definition of their duties during emergency activation needs to be decided upon and made a part of their Basic Plans. As developed, these Bureau specific decisions, will be incorporated into the plan.
|-
|#3
|''"For this reason, the City has endorsed a three tier EMC''<ref>EMC stands for "Emergency Management Committee", which later became the EMSC (Emergency Management Steering Committee) that exists today.</ref> ''concept. This concept blends the legal mandates of the government structure with the private resources of the community. By working together and maintaining open lines of communication, we will be able to field and coordinate a tremendous amount of resources and talent."''
|The responsibility of the EMC as outlined in the Basic Plan on page 9 is to "plan exercise schedule, budget recommendations, public education, update bureau and office plans, coordinate training, make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council (DPC), meet as necessary and involve bureaus and office directors." The Mayor and Council has approved the plan with these responsibilities listed and yet it is uncertain whether all EMC members recognize their part in City Emergencies. These responsibilities need to be clarified and reaffirmed by the EMC.
|As of January, 1997 the job description of the EMC will be changed to" Approve exercise schedule; coordinate public education; make budget recommendations; coordinate Bureau and Office plans with the Basic Plan; approve training coordination; Make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council" in the Basic Plan.
|-
|#4
|''"The Chief of the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Emergency Manager and the Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM)''<ref>POEM later became PBEM.</ref> ''are charged with the responsibility to develop and implement an all hazards emergency management plan in the City of Portland."''
|POEM needs to continue giving assistance in Basic Plan compliance through training, exercises, and technical expertise. POEM will continue to integrate the results of exercises and actual events into the development of the all hazards plan.
|The EMC, through its growth and development, will further identify and define the responsibilities of the bureaus and continue to facilitate a cooperative working environment. Future exercises will incorporate appropriate sections of the Basic Plan.
|-
|#5
|''"This Plan attempts to define in a straight forward manner who does what, when, where, and how in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters."''
|The plan needs to better define Bureau involvement.
|The EMC will review and approve the update of Plan (as prepared by POEM Staff) to define and determine bureau and employee involvement. This updated plan should be submitted to the DPC for approval.
|-
|#6
|''"A disaster occurrence will require prompt and effective emergency response and recovery operations by the City government.<nowiki>''</nowiki>''
|Need better continuity between response and recovery phases.
|Training, identified in review of the flood, will be developed to provide responders with a greater understanding of the relationship between the phases and transitional process.
|-
|#7
|style="background: yellow"|''"Secondary city emergency operations will be based on the principle of self-help."''
|style="background: yellow"|Need greater understanding of complimentary aspects of Neighborhood Emergency Teams to the functions of Emergency Responders; More employee training on emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery in the workplace and at home; Task specific training for sections such as crisis communication; More public education on disaster planning for organizations, businesses and industry.
|style="background: yellow"|NET training continues to instruct citizens in 72 hour self sufficiency in the time of an emergency. Greater employee training is in the planning stage. Business and industry training is available through the Fire Bureau, Red Cross and other agencies. Inside Line will release regionally coordinated messages in January. The Flood Mitigation Workgroup recommended the development of an outreach and public information program to inform people of flood and landslide risks, mitigation measures and flood insurance.
|-
|#8
|''"City government will bear the responsibility for utilizing all available local resources."''
|Identification of local resources is a part of the planning and exercise process. POEM needs to develop city legislation necessary to avoid gouging by vendors and contractors during emergencies. This legislation should not only protect city agencies but the general public. The Logistics Section needs to continue to compile a list of contracted vendors.
|The EMC will be asked to review the proposed legislation. The Logistics section Chiefs will be encouraged to compile a list.
|-
|#9
|''"Day to Day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency task by the bureaus or agencies concerned."''
|Disaster responders need to be excused from their normal responsibilities until they are no longer needed at the EOC or in the field/task. They also need to be available on an as needed basis during the recovery phase. Bureaus need to identify non-critical City functions that can be suspended during a disaster and those who can be reassigned to accomplish critical functions.
|The Bureau plans will reflect the aforementioned concept of critical/non-critical operations of their work and workforce.
|-
|-
|
|#10
==== Tuesday February 6, 1996 ====
|''"Portland will structure its response to and management of a disaster by using the Incident Command System..."''
<u>Incident Objectives</u>
|Bureau Managers and key personnel need to develop and exercise disaster plans in accordance with the Incident Command System. Identify Bureau emergency operations personnel, develop Bureau specific emergency plans and provide training and exercises for their personnel.
 
|The EMC will be asked to address this issue at their own bureau level.
Safety of Public & Responders
|}
 
Provide for Public sand Bagging/by supplying Bags/Know how/Sand
 
Close transportation routes that are in critical areas
 
Liaison with utilities and other providers
 
Protect life, property and environment
 
<u>Weather report</u> for 6th 7th & 8th wet & blustery; temperature 61 high & 41 low
 
2.35+ inches of rain - expect street flooding
 
<u>Major Events</u>
 
10:27 EOC Activated
 
Phone Bank opened
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Johnson Creek @ 11 ih flooding; Willamette River, Drainage District @ 10.5;
|
==== Wednesday, February 7, 1996 ====
<u>Weather Update</u>
 
Heavy rain continues. Storm total rainfall has reached 8 inches at Eugen . .4 to 5 inches
 
over much of the valley ... and from 8 to 15 inches in the Coast range.
 
Willamette River at Morrison Bridge
 
steady rise to 23 feet by midnight
 
Columbia River at Vancouver
 
rise to 22 feet by 6am Thursday
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Water level at SE 115th and Harold
 
Notified residents to leave the area


Triage patients at Holgate Care Center


Arranged for busses.for transport, Red Cross for shelter, Oregon National Guard cargo
=== Other AAR callouts concerning volunteers ===


trucks, Helicopter for possible rescue, Multnomah County for sled boat and sheriff
* Page 17 in the Logistics section (Staffing subsection) describes the critical need for a Volunteer Coordinator.
* Page 42 mentions the need for PF&R to develop an emergency volunteer program.


boats
== References and Notes ==
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<references />
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Latest revision as of 17:34, 29 December 2023

On February 18th 1996, Oregonian reporter Brian T. Meehan summarized the disaster this way:

"In Downtown Portland, the Willamette crested at 28.6 feet, the top of the harbor wall. Downstream, the Columbia hissed at double the normal current - half again bigger than the Mississippi. Thousands lined the waterfront for a peek at the Willamette, awash in logs and heartache. The river's power was humbling. A line from T.S. Eliot echoed: 'I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable.' Floodwaters tore through Tualatin, Oregon City and Lake Oswego. Rising waters and tumbling hillsides isolated Tillamook and devastated the Columbia County towns of Vernonia, Clatskanie and Mist. Mud and ruin spilled, but a curious value surfaced. The flood bound people in ways urban life rarely does. Volunteers erected a plywood barrier along Portland's harbor wall. Strangers hauled furniture for people they'll never meet again. Convicts loaded sandbags. Young people led the way. Students from Milwaukie and Rex Putnam high schools reached out to Oak Grove. West Linn students sandbagged a flooded restaurant in arch rival Oregon City. Oregon City, Lake Oswego and Tigard students traded schoolbooks for shovels. Across Oregon, selfless acts knit a new definition of community. Under the worst conditions, many Oregonians put strangers first in the miracle that is the human spirit."

Video: Newscast of the 1996 flood

The February Flood of 1996 response is of interest to both NET volunteers and to the history of emergency management in Portland. For NET volunteers, the 1996 Flood brought the first documented NET deployment event. For Portland, it was the first major disaster response in the "modern era" of emergency management.[1]

NET Roles in the 1996 Flood

Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.
Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.

The 1996 Flood is one of the first documented deployment of NET volunteers.[2] The Portland AAR mentions two volunteers (presumably NETs) assisting five other personnel in the EOC. Alongside spontaneous volunteers, NETs also undoubtedly helped to sandbag and erect barrier fences. However, no record recovered by PBEM says exactly how many NETs deployed. It is also unclear what dates NETs and other volunteers were deployed, but the acute deployment period ran from February 5th to February 9th.

Most notably, PF&R deployed NET volunteers to distribute information to business owners in the central eastside. The Oregonian mentioned NETs engaging in this activity in an article posted to the right on this page.

1996 Portland Floods: Background

The Flood of 1996 in Oregon was a severe weather event that took place in February of that year. It was characterized by heavy rainfall, high winds, and flooding, affecting several regions in the Pacific Northwest, including Portland. The Willamette River crested at 28.55 feet, where the typical level in February is seven feet. According to Joseph Rose with The Oregonian, a convergence of weather events contributed to the flood's cause:

  • Abnormally high rainfall (7.12 inches, 125% above normal) that saturated the soil and had rivers running high in January.
  • Heavy snowfall in the mountains in late January.
  • A weeklong deep freeze in the valley. A headline in the Feb. 2, 1996, Oregonian read: "Cold weather makes plumbers hot item."
  • On Feb. 6, 1996, a warm Pineapple Express jetstream melted the snow while bringing a heavy deluge of rain. That was the trigger.
  • Within hours, every body of water in the region and many on the Oregon Coast suddenly went to flood stage and beyond.[3]

Tragically, the Flood of '96 resulted in eight fatalities, with at least four people losing their lives in one day alone. The flood led to over one hundred landslides in Portland alone and caused millions of dollars in highway damage. Total damages across the region exceeded $1 billion.[4]

The 1996 After Action Report

To download a copy of the 1996 After Action Report, CLICK HERE.
River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.
River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.
Mayor Katz watching the 96 flood.
Portland Mayor Vera Katz stands along "Vera's Wall", where volunteers filled and dropped approximately 40,000 sandbags to keep waters from topping over Waterfront Park.

The aftermath of the 1996 flood led to discussions and efforts to improve flood management and infrastructure resilience in the affected areas. It remains an important event in Oregon's history, highlighting the impact of severe weather on communities and the need for preparedness and response measures.

The Portland AAR from the flood is itself a telling piece of work in the respect that the AAR recommendations/improvement plan is nearly identical to recommendations often seen in City of Portland AARs in decades since. The table below summarizes the report findings. Boxes highlighted in yellow indicate a plan item that ultimately contributed to the development of Portland NET.

# Basic Plan Issue Identified Need Planned Action
#1 "The situations addressed by this Plan are those in which the actions of many different bureaus must be coordinated." Continue to identify Bureaus needing to be more involved or involved at different levels. Reassignment of employees, volunteer management and section job descriptions have been identified as areas needing attention. As of January1997 the Basic Plan revision includes reference to job descriptions, including time commitments, and bureau tasks. This will facilitate greater City-wide coordination for the emergency management process. A plan for recruitment and training will be developed for incoming and retained EOC responders.
#2 "It is important to realize that no one bureau is going to rescue a City during a disaster situation. Further, it is true that City government agencies will not possess all resources and talent necessary to protect the citizens of the City." For those who participate as EOC responders, a greater understanding of Bureau resources, responsibilities and capabilities has developed as a result of the relationships built during training, exercises, and actual occurrences. This coordination and familiarization is a subsequent benefit from the process of preparing to respond as a City unified force. The need here is to continue to refine each bureaus and employees' capabilities and responsibilities during a disaster. The understanding of each Bureau's responsibility as a primary or secondary responder, their identification of personnel and definition of their duties during emergency activation needs to be decided upon and made a part of their Basic Plans. As developed, these Bureau specific decisions, will be incorporated into the plan.
#3 "For this reason, the City has endorsed a three tier EMC[5] concept. This concept blends the legal mandates of the government structure with the private resources of the community. By working together and maintaining open lines of communication, we will be able to field and coordinate a tremendous amount of resources and talent." The responsibility of the EMC as outlined in the Basic Plan on page 9 is to "plan exercise schedule, budget recommendations, public education, update bureau and office plans, coordinate training, make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council (DPC), meet as necessary and involve bureaus and office directors." The Mayor and Council has approved the plan with these responsibilities listed and yet it is uncertain whether all EMC members recognize their part in City Emergencies. These responsibilities need to be clarified and reaffirmed by the EMC. As of January, 1997 the job description of the EMC will be changed to" Approve exercise schedule; coordinate public education; make budget recommendations; coordinate Bureau and Office plans with the Basic Plan; approve training coordination; Make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council" in the Basic Plan.
#4 "The Chief of the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Emergency Manager and the Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM)[6] are charged with the responsibility to develop and implement an all hazards emergency management plan in the City of Portland." POEM needs to continue giving assistance in Basic Plan compliance through training, exercises, and technical expertise. POEM will continue to integrate the results of exercises and actual events into the development of the all hazards plan. The EMC, through its growth and development, will further identify and define the responsibilities of the bureaus and continue to facilitate a cooperative working environment. Future exercises will incorporate appropriate sections of the Basic Plan.
#5 "This Plan attempts to define in a straight forward manner who does what, when, where, and how in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters." The plan needs to better define Bureau involvement. The EMC will review and approve the update of Plan (as prepared by POEM Staff) to define and determine bureau and employee involvement. This updated plan should be submitted to the DPC for approval.
#6 "A disaster occurrence will require prompt and effective emergency response and recovery operations by the City government.'' Need better continuity between response and recovery phases. Training, identified in review of the flood, will be developed to provide responders with a greater understanding of the relationship between the phases and transitional process.
#7 "Secondary city emergency operations will be based on the principle of self-help." Need greater understanding of complimentary aspects of Neighborhood Emergency Teams to the functions of Emergency Responders; More employee training on emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery in the workplace and at home; Task specific training for sections such as crisis communication; More public education on disaster planning for organizations, businesses and industry. NET training continues to instruct citizens in 72 hour self sufficiency in the time of an emergency. Greater employee training is in the planning stage. Business and industry training is available through the Fire Bureau, Red Cross and other agencies. Inside Line will release regionally coordinated messages in January. The Flood Mitigation Workgroup recommended the development of an outreach and public information program to inform people of flood and landslide risks, mitigation measures and flood insurance.
#8 "City government will bear the responsibility for utilizing all available local resources." Identification of local resources is a part of the planning and exercise process. POEM needs to develop city legislation necessary to avoid gouging by vendors and contractors during emergencies. This legislation should not only protect city agencies but the general public. The Logistics Section needs to continue to compile a list of contracted vendors. The EMC will be asked to review the proposed legislation. The Logistics section Chiefs will be encouraged to compile a list.
#9 "Day to Day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency task by the bureaus or agencies concerned." Disaster responders need to be excused from their normal responsibilities until they are no longer needed at the EOC or in the field/task. They also need to be available on an as needed basis during the recovery phase. Bureaus need to identify non-critical City functions that can be suspended during a disaster and those who can be reassigned to accomplish critical functions. The Bureau plans will reflect the aforementioned concept of critical/non-critical operations of their work and workforce.
#10 "Portland will structure its response to and management of a disaster by using the Incident Command System..." Bureau Managers and key personnel need to develop and exercise disaster plans in accordance with the Incident Command System. Identify Bureau emergency operations personnel, develop Bureau specific emergency plans and provide training and exercises for their personnel. The EMC will be asked to address this issue at their own bureau level.


Other AAR callouts concerning volunteers

  • Page 17 in the Logistics section (Staffing subsection) describes the critical need for a Volunteer Coordinator.
  • Page 42 mentions the need for PF&R to develop an emergency volunteer program.

References and Notes

  1. "Modern era of emergency management" would include any major disaster since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prior to that year, disaster response at the federal level was fragmented across agencies. Portland had, of course, experienced disasters prior to the 1996 flood. But it appears the flood was the incident that involved local bureaus collaborating using the Incident Command System (ICS).
  2. The first known NET deployment was on December 12 of the prior year for a windstorm, but that was obviously on a smaller scale.
  3. Oregonian/OregonLive, J. R. |. (2020, February 5). Remembering Oregon’s epic 1996 flood (photos). Oregonlive. https://www.oregonlive.com/history/2016/02/oregon_flood_of_1996_20_years.html
  4. NOAA’s National Weather Service. (n.d.). Flooding in Oregon. https://www.weather.gov/safety/flood-states-or
  5. EMC stands for "Emergency Management Committee", which later became the EMSC (Emergency Management Steering Committee) that exists today.
  6. POEM later became PBEM.