1996 High Water Flood: Difference between revisions

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On February 18<sup>th</sup> 1996, Oregonian reporter Brian T. Meehan summarized the disaster this way:


== City of Portland Official High Water Flood After Action Report (AAR) ==
''"In Downtown Portland, the Willamette crested at 28.6 feet, the top of the harbor wall. Downstream, the Columbia hissed at double the normal current - half again bigger than the Mississippi.'' ''Thousands lined the waterfront for a peek at the Willamette, awash in logs and heartache. The river's power was humbling. A line from T.S. Eliot echoed:'' 'I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable.' ''Floodwaters tore through Tualatin, Oregon City and Lake Oswego. Rising waters and tumbling hillsides isolated Tillamook and devastated the Columbia County towns of Vernonia, Clatskanie and Mist.'' ''Mud and ruin spilled, but a curious value surfaced. The flood bound people in ways urban life rarely does. Volunteers erected a plywood barrier along Portland's harbor wall. Strangers hauled furniture for people they'll never meet again. Convicts loaded sandbags.'' ''Young people led the way. Students from Milwaukie and Rex Putnam high schools reached out to Oak Grove. West Linn students sandbagged a flooded restaurant in arch rival Oregon City. Oregon City, Lake Oswego and Tigard students traded schoolbooks for shovels.'' ''Across Oregon, selfless acts knit a new definition of community. Under the worst conditions, many Oregonians put strangers first in the miracle that is the human spirit."''
{{#ev:youtube|jspW0z_bD80|350|right|'''''Video: Newscast of the 1996 flood'''''|frame}}


'''The February Flood of 1996 response is of interest to both NET volunteers and to the history of emergency management in Portland.''' For NET volunteers, the 1996 Flood brought the first documented NET deployment event. For Portland, it was the first major disaster response in the "modern era" of emergency management.<ref>"Modern era of emergency management" would include any major disaster since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prior to that year, disaster response at the federal level was fragmented across agencies. Portland had, of course, experienced disasters [[Historic Disasters in the Portland Metro Area|prior to the 1996 flood]]. But it appears the flood was the incident that involved local bureaus collaborating using the Incident Command System (ICS).</ref>


== NET Roles in the 1996 Flood ==
[[File:1996.02.09.Helping Hands.jpg|alt=Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.|thumb|350x350px|''Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.'']]
'''The 1996 Flood is one of the first documented deployment of NET volunteers.'''<ref>The '''''first''''' known NET deployment was on December 12 of the prior year for a windstorm, but that was obviously on a smaller scale.</ref> The Portland AAR mentions two volunteers (presumably NETs) assisting five other personnel in the EOC. Alongside spontaneous volunteers, NETs also undoubtedly helped to sandbag and erect barrier fences. However, no record recovered by PBEM says exactly how many NETs deployed. It is also unclear what dates NETs and other volunteers were deployed, but the acute deployment period ran from February 5<sup>th</sup> to February 9<sup>th</sup>.


Most notably, PF&R deployed NET volunteers to distribute information to business owners in the central eastside. ''The Oregonian'' mentioned NETs engaging in this activity [https://portlandnet.tumblr.com/post/187782471860/nets-during-the-1996-flood-net-volunteer-nicholas in an article] posted to the right on this page.


== 1996 Portland Floods: Background ==
The Flood of 1996 in Oregon was a severe weather event that took place in February of that year. It was characterized by heavy rainfall, high winds, and flooding, affecting several regions in the Pacific Northwest, including Portland. The Willamette River crested at 28.55 feet, where the typical level in February is seven feet.
According to Joseph Rose with ''The Oregonian'', a convergence of weather events contributed to the flood's cause:


=== Flood Response Activity Log ===
* Abnormally high rainfall (7.12 inches, 125% above normal) that saturated the soil and had rivers running high in January.
{| class="wikitable"
* Heavy snowfall in the mountains in late January.
|-
* A weeklong deep freeze in the valley. A headline in the Feb. 2, 1996, Oregonian read: "Cold weather makes plumbers hot item."
|
* On Feb. 6, 1996, a warm Pineapple Express jetstream melted the snow while bringing a heavy deluge of rain. That was [https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2019WR024950 the trigger].
==== Tuesday February 6, 1996 ====
* Within hours, every body of water in the region and many on the Oregon Coast suddenly went to flood stage and beyond.<ref>Oregonian/OregonLive, J. R. |. (2020, February 5). Remembering Oregon’s epic 1996 flood (photos). ''Oregonlive''. https://www.oregonlive.com/history/2016/02/oregon_flood_of_1996_20_years.html</ref>
<u>Incident Objectives</u>


Safety of Public & Responders
Tragically, the Flood of '96 resulted in eight fatalities, with at least four people losing their lives in one day alone. The flood led to over one hundred landslides in Portland alone and caused millions of dollars in highway damage. Total damages across the region exceeded $1 billion.<ref>NOAA’s National Weather Service. (n.d.). ''Flooding in Oregon''. https://www.weather.gov/safety/flood-states-or</ref>


Provide for Public sand Bagging/by supplying Bags/Know how/Sand
== The 1996 After Action Report ==
{| class="wikitable" style="width: 40%;"
|+
| style="background: lightcyan" |'''To download a copy of the 1996 After Action Report, [https://hcpaw.portlandoregon.gov/u/9BchGB2XIXnmFyEb/0bfc21fc-5c40-4e4d-a14a-e8a7a51159f4?l CLICK HERE].'''
|}
[[File:1996 Flood Graph.jpg|alt=River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.|thumb|''River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.''|350x350px]]
[[File:Katz 96 Flood.jpg|alt=Mayor Katz watching the 96 flood.|thumb|350x350px|''Portland Mayor Vera Katz stands along "[https://www.wweek.com/portland/article-23431-feb-8-1996-vera-katz-builds-her-wall.html Vera's Wall]", where volunteers filled and dropped approximately 40,000 sandbags to keep waters from topping over Waterfront Park.'']]
The aftermath of the 1996 flood led to discussions and efforts to improve flood management and infrastructure resilience in the affected areas. It remains an important event in Oregon's history, highlighting the impact of severe weather on communities and the need for preparedness and response measures.


Close transportation routes that are in critical areas
The Portland AAR from the flood is itself a telling piece of work in the respect that the AAR recommendations/improvement plan is nearly identical to recommendations often seen in City of Portland AARs in decades since. The table below summarizes the report findings. Boxes highlighted in yellow indicate a plan item that ultimately contributed to the development of Portland NET.
 
{| class="wikitable" style="width: 60%;"
Liaison with utilities and other providers
|+
 
!'''#'''
Protect life, property and environment
!Basic Plan Issue
 
!Identified Need
<u>Weather report</u> for 6th 7th & 8th wet & blustery; temperature 61 high & 41 low
!Planned Action
 
|-
2.35+ inches of rain - expect street flooding
|#1
 
|''"The situations addressed by this Plan are those in which the actions of many different bureaus must be coordinated."''
<u>Major Events</u>
|style="background: yellow"|Continue to identify Bureaus needing to be more involved or involved at different levels. Reassignment of employees, volunteer management and section job descriptions have been identified as areas needing attention.
 
|As of January1997 the Basic Plan revision includes reference to job descriptions, including time commitments, and bureau tasks. This will facilitate greater City-wide coordination for the emergency management process. A plan for recruitment and training will be developed for incoming and retained EOC responders.
10:27 EOC Activated
|-
 
|#2
Phone Bank opened
|''"It is important to realize that no one bureau is going to rescue a City during a disaster situation. Further, it is true that City government agencies will not possess all resources and talent necessary to protect the citizens of the City."''
 
|For those who participate as EOC responders, a greater understanding of Bureau resources, responsibilities and capabilities has developed as a result of the relationships built during training, exercises, and actual occurrences. This coordination and familiarization is a subsequent benefit from the process of preparing to respond as a City unified force. The need here is to continue to refine each bureaus and employees' capabilities and responsibilities during a disaster.
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
|The understanding of each Bureau's responsibility as a primary or secondary responder, their identification of personnel and definition of their duties during emergency activation needs to be decided upon and made a part of their Basic Plans. As developed, these Bureau specific decisions, will be incorporated into the plan.
 
|-
Johnson Creek @ 11 ih flooding; Willamette River, Drainage District @ 10.5;
|#3
|
|''"For this reason, the City has endorsed a three tier EMC''<ref>EMC stands for "Emergency Management Committee", which later became the EMSC (Emergency Management Steering Committee) that exists today.</ref> ''concept. This concept blends the legal mandates of the government structure with the private resources of the community. By working together and maintaining open lines of communication, we will be able to field and coordinate a tremendous amount of resources and talent."''
==== Wednesday, February 7, 1996 ====
|The responsibility of the EMC as outlined in the Basic Plan on page 9 is to "plan exercise schedule, budget recommendations, public education, update bureau and office plans, coordinate training, make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council (DPC), meet as necessary and involve bureaus and office directors." The Mayor and Council has approved the plan with these responsibilities listed and yet it is uncertain whether all EMC members recognize their part in City Emergencies. These responsibilities need to be clarified and reaffirmed by the EMC.
<u>Weather Update</u>
|As of January, 1997 the job description of the EMC will be changed to" Approve exercise schedule; coordinate public education; make budget recommendations; coordinate Bureau and Office plans with the Basic Plan; approve training coordination; Make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council" in the Basic Plan.
 
|-
Heavy rain continues. Storm total rainfall has reached 8 inches at Eugen . .4 to 5 inches
|#4
 
|''"The Chief of the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Emergency Manager and the Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM)''<ref>POEM later became PBEM.</ref> ''are charged with the responsibility to develop and implement an all hazards emergency management plan in the City of Portland."''
over much of the valley ... and from 8 to 15 inches in the Coast range.
|POEM needs to continue giving assistance in Basic Plan compliance through training, exercises, and technical expertise. POEM will continue to integrate the results of exercises and actual events into the development of the all hazards plan.
 
|The EMC, through its growth and development, will further identify and define the responsibilities of the bureaus and continue to facilitate a cooperative working environment. Future exercises will incorporate appropriate sections of the Basic Plan.
Willamette River at Morrison Bridge
|-
 
|#5
steady rise to 23 feet by midnight
|''"This Plan attempts to define in a straight forward manner who does what, when, where, and how in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters."''
 
|The plan needs to better define Bureau involvement.
Columbia River at Vancouver
|The EMC will review and approve the update of Plan (as prepared by POEM Staff) to define and determine bureau and employee involvement. This updated plan should be submitted to the DPC for approval.
 
|-
rise to 22 feet by 6am Thursday
|#6
 
|''"A disaster occurrence will require prompt and effective emergency response and recovery operations by the City government.<nowiki>''</nowiki>''
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
|Need better continuity between response and recovery phases.
 
|Training, identified in review of the flood, will be developed to provide responders with a greater understanding of the relationship between the phases and transitional process.
Water level at SE 115th and Harold
|-
 
|#7
Notified residents to leave the area
|style="background: yellow"|''"Secondary city emergency operations will be based on the principle of self-help."''
 
|style="background: yellow"|Need greater understanding of complimentary aspects of Neighborhood Emergency Teams to the functions of Emergency Responders; More employee training on emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery in the workplace and at home; Task specific training for sections such as crisis communication; More public education on disaster planning for organizations, businesses and industry.
Triage patients at Holgate Care Center
|style="background: yellow"|NET training continues to instruct citizens in 72 hour self sufficiency in the time of an emergency. Greater employee training is in the planning stage. Business and industry training is available through the Fire Bureau, Red Cross and other agencies. Inside Line will release regionally coordinated messages in January. The Flood Mitigation Workgroup recommended the development of an outreach and public information program to inform people of flood and landslide risks, mitigation measures and flood insurance.
 
Arranged for busses.for transport, Red Cross for shelter, Oregon National Guard cargo
 
trucks, Helicopter for possible rescue, Multnomah County for sled boat and sheriff
 
boats
|
==== Thursday February 8, 1996 ====
<u>Weather Update</u>
 
Rain this evening ...locally heavy ...turning to showers, lows to mid 40s
 
Willamette - 28.8 feet
 
Action Taken
 
Mayor calls for carpenters to bring their tools and volunteer to come either side of the
 
Willamette under the Burnside Bridge to reinforce river walls
 
Willamette Seawall provided 430 concrete barriers, 400 sheets of plywood and 1200Lft
 
2x6
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Actual evacuation of Johnson Creek area
 
Fear of breakaway houseboats on Columbia & Willamette
 
Sauvie Island flooding
 
Sandbag locations established at 12 places around city
 
Red Cross identifies five shelters
 
Columbia River dikes
|-
|-
|
|#8
==== Friday February 9, 1996 ====
|''"City government will bear the responsibility for utilizing all available local resources."''
<u>Weather Update</u>
|Identification of local resources is a part of the planning and exercise process. POEM needs to develop city legislation necessary to avoid gouging by vendors and contractors during emergencies. This legislation should not only protect city agencies but the general public. The Logistics Section needs to continue to compile a list of contracted vendors.
 
|The EMC will be asked to review the proposed legislation. The Logistics section Chiefs will be encouraged to compile a list.
temperature 40 degrees; rain
 
Willamette at 27.5;
 
<u>Action taken</u>
 
A houseboat and yacht which broke loose up river from the Sellwood was boarded and
 
found empty.
 
Water supply was determined to be stable so no boil water notice was issued.
 
Fred Cuthbertson was designated as the City representative for cost recovery process
 
by OEM.
 
Clean up Plan begun between Metro & BES
 
Flood warning for Johnson Creek Canceled
 
Road closures -HWY 26, HWY30;Barbur Blvd., Macadam Ave., Front Ave., Burnside
 
Bridge and Street, Sam Jackson Parkway, OHSU, Hawthorne Bridge, Marine Drive,
 
Foster Road, 1-84 Eastbound
 
Hayden Island declared an emergency area
 
Levee Inspection schedule developed around the clock
|
==== Saturday February 10, 1996 ====
<u>Weather Update</u>
 
Mostly sunny, few high clouds, Highs 50-55
 
NE wind 10 to 20 mph
 
<u>Concerns</u>
 
Regional recovery plan needs fo begin
 
Regional Recycling plan needed
 
Traffic Management plan needed
 
<u>Actions Taken</u>
 
Arrangements made for arrival for FEMA director, James Lee Witt
 
33rd & Columbia - dike OK, but 24 hour monitoring continues
 
Damage assessment Teams are put in place from each bureau to assess City property
 
Medical Plan amended for contact with contaminated water
 
New staffing pattern for EOC developed
|
==== Sunday, February 11, 1996 ====
<u>Concerns</u>
 
Monitor water levels in "Ramona Lake" - (Holgate btw 120th & 136th)
 
Concern of the stability of levees along Marine Drive will continue until river drops to
 
22.5 ft
 
Worker Safety paramount concern due to fatigue
 
<u>Action Taken</u>
 
Plan development
|-
|-
|
|#9
==== Monday February 12, 1996 ====
|''"Day to Day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency task by the bureaus or agencies concerned."''
<u>River Status</u>
|Disaster responders need to be excused from their normal responsibilities until they are no longer needed at the EOC or in the field/task. They also need to be available on an as needed basis during the recovery phase. Bureaus need to identify non-critical City functions that can be suspended during a disaster and those who can be reassigned to accomplish critical functions.
 
|The Bureau plans will reflect the aforementioned concept of critical/non-critical operations of their work and workforce.
Willamette at Portland - 23. 9 ft.
 
Columbia River 23.2 ft.
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Willamette River sea wall removal after President Clinton's visit
 
Donation plan
 
<u>Actions Taken</u>
 
HazMat Plan developed
 
Hayden Island reopened for public access
 
Citizens requested to avoid the hilly areas of Portland due to landslides
 
115 roads closed within Portland jurisdiction
 
Mandatory water restriction in effect for all outdoor uses and voluntary reduction of all
 
indoor water use. Metropolitan region is served by the City's back up wells which have
 
limited capacity to produce water.
|
==== Tuesday, February 13, 1996 ====
<u>Weather Update</u>
 
high 63-67 low 35-39
 
<u>River Levels</u>
 
Willamette 21.0
 
Columbia 19.6
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Regional recovery efforts
 
Hazardous waste collection and disposal
 
removal of sea wall
 
traffic plan
 
<u>Actions Taken</u>
 
Bureaus are communicating their individual plans to EOG, including BES activities
 
downtown, deployment of crews from the Water Bureau to the dikes, activity on
 
landslide removal with Maintenance Crews and flood recovery activities by Parks
 
Bureau;
 
Incident radio communications report increased to include 12 talk groups
 
Salvation Army offers to handle donations of food and clothing
 
Bureau of Buildings develop a plan for assessment teams which is systematic for
 
gathering early estimates·
 
Haz Mat team instructs public on waste sites and handling procedures
 
Flood Debris Sites are established
 
The following bureaus allocated resources to flood damage recovery today: Auditors
 
Office, Bureau of Buildings, Commissioners. Offices, Bureaus of Emergency
 
Communications, Environmental Services, Risk Management, Fire, General Services,
 
Maintenance, Parks and Recreation, Planning, Police, Purchases, Transportation
 
Engineering, Traffic Management and Water, Mayors Office and the Office of
 
Transportation.
 
Development of a Volunteer Coordination Plan
|
==== Wednesday, February 14, 1996 ====
President Clinton Arrives in Portland
 
<u>River Levels</u>
 
Willamete 19.2
 
Columbia ~9.0
 
<u>Areas of Concern</u>
 
Marine Drive, Seawall removal, Ramona Lake, traffic due to closures, hazardous
 
materials collection;
 
<u>Actions Taken</u>
 
29 slides listed
 
Water restriction released
|-
|-
|
|#10
==== Thursday February 15, 1996 ====
|''"Portland will structure its response to and management of a disaster by using the Incident Command System..."''
<u>Weather Update</u>
|Bureau Managers and key personnel need to develop and exercise disaster plans in accordance with the Incident Command System. Identify Bureau emergency operations personnel, develop Bureau specific emergency plans and provide training and exercises for their personnel.
|The EMC will be asked to address this issue at their own bureau level.
|}


Extended forecast for a month showing little precipitation and high of 61 and low of 25


during the period
=== Other AAR callouts concerning volunteers ===


<u>River Levels</u>
* Page 17 in the Logistics section (Staffing subsection) describes the critical need for a Volunteer Coordinator.
* Page 42 mentions the need for PF&R to develop an emergency volunteer program.


Willamette at Portland 16.8
== References and Notes ==
 
<references />
Columbia at Vancouver 16.6
 
<u>Actions Taken</u>
 
143 Slides listed
 
Landslide group formed to assess citizen/city interaction regarding slides
 
Parks estimate damage and clean up cost totaling $2,815,790.
 
BES damage assessment preliminary $80,000
 
Columbia Wastewater Treatment Plan $50,000
|
|
|}

Latest revision as of 16:34, 29 December 2023

On February 18th 1996, Oregonian reporter Brian T. Meehan summarized the disaster this way:

"In Downtown Portland, the Willamette crested at 28.6 feet, the top of the harbor wall. Downstream, the Columbia hissed at double the normal current - half again bigger than the Mississippi. Thousands lined the waterfront for a peek at the Willamette, awash in logs and heartache. The river's power was humbling. A line from T.S. Eliot echoed: 'I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river is a strong brown god - sullen, untamed and intractable.' Floodwaters tore through Tualatin, Oregon City and Lake Oswego. Rising waters and tumbling hillsides isolated Tillamook and devastated the Columbia County towns of Vernonia, Clatskanie and Mist. Mud and ruin spilled, but a curious value surfaced. The flood bound people in ways urban life rarely does. Volunteers erected a plywood barrier along Portland's harbor wall. Strangers hauled furniture for people they'll never meet again. Convicts loaded sandbags. Young people led the way. Students from Milwaukie and Rex Putnam high schools reached out to Oak Grove. West Linn students sandbagged a flooded restaurant in arch rival Oregon City. Oregon City, Lake Oswego and Tigard students traded schoolbooks for shovels. Across Oregon, selfless acts knit a new definition of community. Under the worst conditions, many Oregonians put strangers first in the miracle that is the human spirit."

Video: Newscast of the 1996 flood

The February Flood of 1996 response is of interest to both NET volunteers and to the history of emergency management in Portland. For NET volunteers, the 1996 Flood brought the first documented NET deployment event. For Portland, it was the first major disaster response in the "modern era" of emergency management.[1]

NET Roles in the 1996 Flood

Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.
Scan of an Oregonian article from February 9, 1996 featuring NETs conducting door to door public information calls about the flood.

The 1996 Flood is one of the first documented deployment of NET volunteers.[2] The Portland AAR mentions two volunteers (presumably NETs) assisting five other personnel in the EOC. Alongside spontaneous volunteers, NETs also undoubtedly helped to sandbag and erect barrier fences. However, no record recovered by PBEM says exactly how many NETs deployed. It is also unclear what dates NETs and other volunteers were deployed, but the acute deployment period ran from February 5th to February 9th.

Most notably, PF&R deployed NET volunteers to distribute information to business owners in the central eastside. The Oregonian mentioned NETs engaging in this activity in an article posted to the right on this page.

1996 Portland Floods: Background

The Flood of 1996 in Oregon was a severe weather event that took place in February of that year. It was characterized by heavy rainfall, high winds, and flooding, affecting several regions in the Pacific Northwest, including Portland. The Willamette River crested at 28.55 feet, where the typical level in February is seven feet. According to Joseph Rose with The Oregonian, a convergence of weather events contributed to the flood's cause:

  • Abnormally high rainfall (7.12 inches, 125% above normal) that saturated the soil and had rivers running high in January.
  • Heavy snowfall in the mountains in late January.
  • A weeklong deep freeze in the valley. A headline in the Feb. 2, 1996, Oregonian read: "Cold weather makes plumbers hot item."
  • On Feb. 6, 1996, a warm Pineapple Express jetstream melted the snow while bringing a heavy deluge of rain. That was the trigger.
  • Within hours, every body of water in the region and many on the Oregon Coast suddenly went to flood stage and beyond.[3]

Tragically, the Flood of '96 resulted in eight fatalities, with at least four people losing their lives in one day alone. The flood led to over one hundred landslides in Portland alone and caused millions of dollars in highway damage. Total damages across the region exceeded $1 billion.[4]

The 1996 After Action Report

To download a copy of the 1996 After Action Report, CLICK HERE.
River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.
River level graph on page 11 of the original AAR document. The graph doesn't clarify the Columbia or Willamette river, only saying that readings are taken at the I-5 bridge.
Mayor Katz watching the 96 flood.
Portland Mayor Vera Katz stands along "Vera's Wall", where volunteers filled and dropped approximately 40,000 sandbags to keep waters from topping over Waterfront Park.

The aftermath of the 1996 flood led to discussions and efforts to improve flood management and infrastructure resilience in the affected areas. It remains an important event in Oregon's history, highlighting the impact of severe weather on communities and the need for preparedness and response measures.

The Portland AAR from the flood is itself a telling piece of work in the respect that the AAR recommendations/improvement plan is nearly identical to recommendations often seen in City of Portland AARs in decades since. The table below summarizes the report findings. Boxes highlighted in yellow indicate a plan item that ultimately contributed to the development of Portland NET.

# Basic Plan Issue Identified Need Planned Action
#1 "The situations addressed by this Plan are those in which the actions of many different bureaus must be coordinated." Continue to identify Bureaus needing to be more involved or involved at different levels. Reassignment of employees, volunteer management and section job descriptions have been identified as areas needing attention. As of January1997 the Basic Plan revision includes reference to job descriptions, including time commitments, and bureau tasks. This will facilitate greater City-wide coordination for the emergency management process. A plan for recruitment and training will be developed for incoming and retained EOC responders.
#2 "It is important to realize that no one bureau is going to rescue a City during a disaster situation. Further, it is true that City government agencies will not possess all resources and talent necessary to protect the citizens of the City." For those who participate as EOC responders, a greater understanding of Bureau resources, responsibilities and capabilities has developed as a result of the relationships built during training, exercises, and actual occurrences. This coordination and familiarization is a subsequent benefit from the process of preparing to respond as a City unified force. The need here is to continue to refine each bureaus and employees' capabilities and responsibilities during a disaster. The understanding of each Bureau's responsibility as a primary or secondary responder, their identification of personnel and definition of their duties during emergency activation needs to be decided upon and made a part of their Basic Plans. As developed, these Bureau specific decisions, will be incorporated into the plan.
#3 "For this reason, the City has endorsed a three tier EMC[5] concept. This concept blends the legal mandates of the government structure with the private resources of the community. By working together and maintaining open lines of communication, we will be able to field and coordinate a tremendous amount of resources and talent." The responsibility of the EMC as outlined in the Basic Plan on page 9 is to "plan exercise schedule, budget recommendations, public education, update bureau and office plans, coordinate training, make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council (DPC), meet as necessary and involve bureaus and office directors." The Mayor and Council has approved the plan with these responsibilities listed and yet it is uncertain whether all EMC members recognize their part in City Emergencies. These responsibilities need to be clarified and reaffirmed by the EMC. As of January, 1997 the job description of the EMC will be changed to" Approve exercise schedule; coordinate public education; make budget recommendations; coordinate Bureau and Office plans with the Basic Plan; approve training coordination; Make recommendations to the Disaster Policy Council" in the Basic Plan.
#4 "The Chief of the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Emergency Manager and the Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM)[6] are charged with the responsibility to develop and implement an all hazards emergency management plan in the City of Portland." POEM needs to continue giving assistance in Basic Plan compliance through training, exercises, and technical expertise. POEM will continue to integrate the results of exercises and actual events into the development of the all hazards plan. The EMC, through its growth and development, will further identify and define the responsibilities of the bureaus and continue to facilitate a cooperative working environment. Future exercises will incorporate appropriate sections of the Basic Plan.
#5 "This Plan attempts to define in a straight forward manner who does what, when, where, and how in order to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters." The plan needs to better define Bureau involvement. The EMC will review and approve the update of Plan (as prepared by POEM Staff) to define and determine bureau and employee involvement. This updated plan should be submitted to the DPC for approval.
#6 "A disaster occurrence will require prompt and effective emergency response and recovery operations by the City government.'' Need better continuity between response and recovery phases. Training, identified in review of the flood, will be developed to provide responders with a greater understanding of the relationship between the phases and transitional process.
#7 "Secondary city emergency operations will be based on the principle of self-help." Need greater understanding of complimentary aspects of Neighborhood Emergency Teams to the functions of Emergency Responders; More employee training on emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery in the workplace and at home; Task specific training for sections such as crisis communication; More public education on disaster planning for organizations, businesses and industry. NET training continues to instruct citizens in 72 hour self sufficiency in the time of an emergency. Greater employee training is in the planning stage. Business and industry training is available through the Fire Bureau, Red Cross and other agencies. Inside Line will release regionally coordinated messages in January. The Flood Mitigation Workgroup recommended the development of an outreach and public information program to inform people of flood and landslide risks, mitigation measures and flood insurance.
#8 "City government will bear the responsibility for utilizing all available local resources." Identification of local resources is a part of the planning and exercise process. POEM needs to develop city legislation necessary to avoid gouging by vendors and contractors during emergencies. This legislation should not only protect city agencies but the general public. The Logistics Section needs to continue to compile a list of contracted vendors. The EMC will be asked to review the proposed legislation. The Logistics section Chiefs will be encouraged to compile a list.
#9 "Day to Day functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of any emergency. The efforts that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to the accomplishment of emergency task by the bureaus or agencies concerned." Disaster responders need to be excused from their normal responsibilities until they are no longer needed at the EOC or in the field/task. They also need to be available on an as needed basis during the recovery phase. Bureaus need to identify non-critical City functions that can be suspended during a disaster and those who can be reassigned to accomplish critical functions. The Bureau plans will reflect the aforementioned concept of critical/non-critical operations of their work and workforce.
#10 "Portland will structure its response to and management of a disaster by using the Incident Command System..." Bureau Managers and key personnel need to develop and exercise disaster plans in accordance with the Incident Command System. Identify Bureau emergency operations personnel, develop Bureau specific emergency plans and provide training and exercises for their personnel. The EMC will be asked to address this issue at their own bureau level.


Other AAR callouts concerning volunteers

  • Page 17 in the Logistics section (Staffing subsection) describes the critical need for a Volunteer Coordinator.
  • Page 42 mentions the need for PF&R to develop an emergency volunteer program.

References and Notes

  1. "Modern era of emergency management" would include any major disaster since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prior to that year, disaster response at the federal level was fragmented across agencies. Portland had, of course, experienced disasters prior to the 1996 flood. But it appears the flood was the incident that involved local bureaus collaborating using the Incident Command System (ICS).
  2. The first known NET deployment was on December 12 of the prior year for a windstorm, but that was obviously on a smaller scale.
  3. Oregonian/OregonLive, J. R. |. (2020, February 5). Remembering Oregon’s epic 1996 flood (photos). Oregonlive. https://www.oregonlive.com/history/2016/02/oregon_flood_of_1996_20_years.html
  4. NOAA’s National Weather Service. (n.d.). Flooding in Oregon. https://www.weather.gov/safety/flood-states-or
  5. EMC stands for "Emergency Management Committee", which later became the EMSC (Emergency Management Steering Committee) that exists today.
  6. POEM later became PBEM.